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In her thought provoking and challenging paper Karin van Marle reflects on the 
theme of diversity and legal reasoning from the vantage point of epistemology and 
feminist knowledges. She draws upon the work of Arendt, Butler and Rose to raise 
critical questions of self, power, voice, authority and the production of knowledge and 
to challenge the ways in which existing social, political and legal practices 
marginalize minority voices, knowledge and lived experience. At the heart of Karin’s 
paper lie critical questions on the operative and constitutive effects of belonging and 
identity, conceptualizations of the ‘centre and periphery’ and the ways in which 
discourses on diversity in law continue to reflect unequal power relations.  In asking 
these questions she interrogates epistemically the ways in which existing diverse 
practices in legal reasoning can be disrupted, transformed and resisted and how the 
fluid interplay of diverse, feminist knowledges and plural experiences can produce 
new ways of thinking.  In this way, the normative or descriptive notion of diversity in 
liberal debates (that focus on the accommodation and recognition of ‘diversity’) may 
be transformed in new ways of living together in the contexts of radical diversity. This 
critical interrogation draws upon feminist and critical scholarship to consider how 
existing liberal debates on diversity can “end up keeping the centre intact by allowing 
diverse voices and views in such a way that they remain exactly that, diverse views 
and voices that are raised ”(p 1).  Instead Karin offers new theoretical tools to rupture 
existing knowledge and considers the ways in which real and sustained change to 
the production and recognition of alternative diverse knowledges and viewpoints can 
take place in full and meaningful ways, thereby reshaping legal reasoning as diverse. 
In other words she challenges the ways in which diversity projects and practices that 
maintain and reinforce existing unequal power relations lead to the continuation of 
unequal outcomes. A critical reevaluation opens, therefore, new possibilities for law 
and legal change. 
 
In this paper I reflect on some of the important insights Karin provides while linking 
some of these to wider debates on diversity and the marginalization of those on the 
periphery of law and decision-making. For example, who belongs in the centre and 
who remains located on the periphery? Can voices that have historically and socially 
been excluded in debates on diversity ever be included in a legal context that 
operates as part of a neoliberal state that imagines law in specific ways based on 
fixed notions of belonging and otherness? More importantly what are the conditions 
upon which difference and race, class and gender oppression exist in diversity 
debates? Underpinning this are debates on resistance and the ways in which 
resistance takes shape that can become part of the dialogical process of change and 
new knowledges. Critical race theorists and black feminists for example have drawn 
upon frameworks of intersectionality and the epistemology of resistance to consider 
the ways in which epistemic injustice that accompanies oppression can be 
overcome.  From the vantage point of resistance they suggest ways in which an 
epistemology of resistance can better shape our understanding of diverse legal 
reasoning, make ruptures to the centre and allow space for new diverse voices. In 
other words social and political critique that allows for subjugated knowledge to be 
* Senior Lecturer, School of Law, SOAS, University of London, UK. Email: sb169@soas.ac.uk _____________________________________________________________________________________________________  1  
                                                        
Samia Bano  Diversity, Knowledge and Power _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
understood as part of political resistance provides crucial insights into challenging 
epistemic injustice and oppression.  
 
Rupturing the Centre 
 
Reflecting upon the work of Achille Mbembe and student campaigns to decolonize 
the university in South African universities, Karin considers the ways in which student 
protests and the emergence of new resistant knowledges to colonial images, 
symbols and statues representing colonial periods of history can be replaced by new 
sets of resistant and emerging knowledges. This process of new knowledge 
production is not a product of a colonial and orientalist imagery but instead is based 
upon universal principles of a normative humanity, one that promotes social 
inclusion, tolerance and diversity while recognizing the continued racism, exclusion 
and stigmatization caused by colonialism and colonial practices that continue to 
produce epistemic harms and injustice.  At the heart of this question lies the question 
too of what constitutes normatively a pluralistic and diverse society.  Karin’s critical 
analysis therefore raises not only a relativist view of diversity but also the question, 
as Butler argues, of what constitutes our epistemic obligations and responsibilities as 
ethical demands as part of a shared humanity.  In other words what demands are 
made on us by new voices and new knowledges and how can we think through the 
ways in which they can be met?  
 
Karin asks whether the concern with radical or deep diversity entails a re-centreing 
and if so how we can acknowledge the difference that ruptures the core of privileged 
knowledge, voice and authority. Is rupture to existing legal culture possible and 
feasible in the context of existing unequal structures of law and legality? For Mbembe 
decolonizing the university entails two key objectives, first a critique of the 
Eurocentric university model, and second to imagine and then construct alternative 
models of the university as an inclusive, diverse space that encapsulates multiple 
voices. In South African universities student protests have taken the form of resistant 
acts that aim to produce alternative knowledges, thereby subverting existing 
university claims of diversity while challenging the complicity of unequal power 
relations in the power structures of the university setting. This production of 
knowledge as resistance and the production of resistant acts contributes to and 
facilitates new epistemic transformations and new processes of knowledge 
production.  It further highlights not only the privileging of whiteness and the west in 
the social structure of the university setting but also the ways in which internal forms 
of resistance against the campaign to decolonize the university can take shape. The 
institutional bias against this kind of resistance contributes to the privileging of 
existing knowledge as the truth and immutable.  In other words from the vantage 
point of epistemic violence can knowledge deemed marginal emerge from structural 
inequalities and oppression? 
 
Such campaigns to decolonize the university have taken place across a number of 
universities in different national contexts. One recent example was found at SOAS 
(School of Oriental and African Studies), University of London.  This campaign was 
led by students to decolonize the curriculum in collaboration with University College 
London’s Why Is My Curriculum White Campaign.1 The campaign focused on the 
1 See https://www.nus.org.uk/en/news/why-is-my-curriculum-white/.  
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privileging of both male and white dominance in the curriculum with the students 
stating:  
 
One of the key aspects of this campaign is for us to examine the ways in 
which Western philosophy puts a specific conception of Man at the centre. 
This enables the myth of ‘universal truth’ as being a body of knowledge that 
has dictated the current colonial structure of the world we live in today. The 
campaign will be looking at ways SOAS as an institution can incorporate 
other forms of knowing and grant the same credence to metaphysical and 
transcendental systems of knowledge from the Global South as it does to 
systems of knowledge that have emerged from Western Europe.2 
 
The challenge from students to critique and question the privileging of certain forms 
of knowledge present in the curriculum coupled with a critique of the complex 
relations of institutional power, authority and bias led to a systematic backlash 
against the student campaign, at times vociferous and vitriolic while singling out 
individual student campaigners. In particular, the media response to this campaign 
provides an interesting example of the ways in which epistemic harms were caused 
against campaign leaders and organizers for the act of simply calling into question 
the use of hegemonic knowledges as authoritative and fixed in university curricula 
and teaching.  
 
SOAS student campaigners were accused of seeking to remove white philosophers 
such as Plato and Kant from reading lists, to be replaced exclusively by black 
thinkers and scholars.3 Black and minority ethnic students were labelled “dangerous” 
for seeking to erode the universal value of philosophical literature and western 
thought while endangering university education and learning for all students. Thus in 
the face of such a backlash to calls for diversity and to make the university 
curriculum diverse, how do we respond to the challenge to the dominant hegemonic 
knowledge found in university curricula and its epistemic harms? Of course 
universities share a collective responsibility to challenge the privilege and injustice 
often found endemic in university institutions coupled with the need to address the 
marginalization of particular kinds of intellectual voices and scholarship with spaces 
for critical engagement and debate.  The response by the media to the SOAS 
campaign illustrates that any production of alternative, resistant knowledges, even 
within the context of a university, can be dismissed as unqualified knowledge, 
resulting in the continued epistemological exclusion and marginalization of alternative 
knowledges. In fact the ruptures to existing Eurocentric knowledge sought by the 
students aimed only for a greater representation of non-European philosophers and 
thinkers in order to envision alternative knowledges and diverse ways of thinking and 
the openness of curricula to critique, contestation and challenge. The pluralism 
envisioned was not one of cultural exceptionalism, racism or cultural approbation but 
the challenging of existing power structures and centreing of marginalized 
knowledges to ensure that diversity does indeed rupture the centre and becomes 
visible on its own terms, and is not simply seen through the eyes of more privileged 
groups. 
My argument here is that those marginalized and on the periphery of decision-
making face multiple obstacles from generalizations of being anti-west and anti- 
2 For a copy of the statement see https://soasunion.org/education/educationalpriorities/.   
3  See for example http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/2017/01/08/university-students-
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modern to distortions and cultural misrepresentations of their campaigns. This often 
involves systemic and structural obstacles where those engaged in the creation of 
new knowledge are given little if any space to challenge the injustice and oppression 
being experienced while continuing to face and resist new epistemic harms. For 
example in student campaigns to decolonize the university and university curricula it 
is the students that are hermeneutically disadvantaged, both as interlocutors and 
campaigners and who are further marginalized and polarized into spaces of ‘them’ 
and ‘us’. Critical voices are disavowed and new knowledge and critical and 
conceptual critique are too easily dismissed. Instead the dominant narratives and 
media cultures seek to silence those who challenge the existing status quo of a very 
specific type of university curriculum and education. Situations of such epistemic 
harms produce effects for not only the university student campaigners in question but 
other members of the marginalized groups who may not directly experience 
university education but who cannot escape the relations of oppression and injustice. 
This form of silencing subjugates marginalized knowledges, where all those deemed 
as belonging to the marginalized group in question are characterized as one and the 
same and where their capacity and contribution to knowledge is questioned, 
undermined and ultimately dismissed. As Foucault explains, it is this relationship 
“through which a society conveys its knowledge and ensures its survival under the 
mask of knowledge” (Foucault 1977: 225). Does this also raise questions of the level 
and type of ethical responsibility each of us holds according to our positions of power 
and marginalization?   
 
Diversity and Legal Reasoning 
 
For Karin the conditions created by plural jurisprudence can lead to practices of 
diverse legal reasoning, that is, a socio-legal transformation predicated on 
overcoming a reductive and fixed notion of diversity in favour of one based on 
heterogeneous and multiple perspectives. 
 
Within a wider context of liberal legal debates, the concept of diversity and its 
normative concern for justice, equality and fairness has long been debated, theorized 
and critiqued. In western European societies the twin goals of the liberal 
‘accommodation’ of cultural and religious differences and practices and the limits of 
such ‘recognition’ have led to the emergence of a renewed liberal political discourse 
dealing with the specific conflicts generated by diverse minority groups. Political and 
social theorists have, for example, long traced the European liberal legal tradition of 
accommodating diversity and difference and the tensions generated by conflicts of 
norms and normativity (social and legal/ state law norms) and the extent to which 
individuals are able to choose between two or more sets of conflicting norms in the 
face of group loyalty versus state law obligations.  
 
Liberal debates therefore focus on the nature and settlement of postcolonial 
migrations and the impact of transnational populations upon settled communities. 
Today, however, there is a growing literature which seeks to understand identities as 
multiple, fluid, dynamic and partial and which can only be understood in interaction 
with other identities, ethnicities and social structures. Yet the problems attributed to 
diversity include the perceived lack of integration of minority ethnic communities into 
western societies leading to the emergence of parallel and segregated minority 
ethnic communities.  
 
So what does diversity as a set of practices, mean in relation to the exclusion of 
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societies ‘diversity’ often encapsulates a set of social and policy practices 
simultaneously recognizing plurality of cultural and religious differences while 
mitigating any transgression of loosely defined civic national identity and values. 
Inevitably this leads to tensions and contradictions from various standpoints both at a 
personal level but also and primarily from state positions.  In Britain, for example, 
critics of diversity point to a crisis in liberal/ left politics in dealing with issues of 
identity, immigration and belonging seen to be at odds with the values of larger 
settled/ majority communities (Goodhart 2017). Yet public commentary also pays 
attention both to the widely perceived failure of ‘diversity’ and to questions focusing 
on the lack of measurable positive outcomes. In other words at its best, diversity 
promotes tolerance, equality and respect for cultural and religious difference, 
promoting positive relations between minority and majority communities, but at its 
worst it promotes segregated, polarized and parallel communities who have little care 
or understanding of how the ‘other’ may live. Thus the ‘immigration and diversity 
question’ (generated by a series of questions over integration/ loyalty to the state/ 
citizenship and diversity) has in recent times, come to be understood as one of the 
defining questions in the twenty-first century when framing, challenging and debating 
the meaning of diversity.  
  
In Excitable Speech Butler argues that “the law is libidinally invested in what it 
legislates” (1997: 103).  Powerful legal structures, legal speech and the liberal legal 
tradition ensure that in a normative sense legal reasoning can neither be diverse (in 
its recognition of alternative knowledge as truths) nor resistant to state power. Butler 
maintains that democratic legal reasoning derives from a political context masking 
the myth of the law as part of a liberal monolithic unity and homogeneity, and 
therefore is unable to address lived experiences of injustice and give voice to 
marginalized and oppressed groups. In Butler’s work on hate speech it becomes 
quite clear that speech uttered and circulated by state politicians targeting 
marginalized groups is synonymous with hate speech and therefore any recourse to 
law or hope of diverse legal reasoning that aims to challenge existing legal 
knowledge becomes of little use. Butler explores in depth the language deployed in 
courts and trial proceedings and analyses the productive, proliferative nature of the 
law to make sense of the effect of law.  She explains, “If the law produces hate 
speech in order to legislate it, it also produces a culpable speaking subject in order to 
prosecute him or her” (1997: 104). This epistemic injustice is underpinned by a state 
law regime whose ideology and discourse provide the context in which speech is 
uttered, denying marginalized groups a voice. The limitations to this argument are, 
however, that discourse and ideology are blamed rather than the agency of the 
perpetrator. As Salih (2002: 104) explains, “This implies that speakers cannot be 
held ultimately responsible for utterances of which they are not the sole originators, 
so that to claim that there is no culpable subject behind the expressions of hate 
speech will require what we consider the efficacy of legal measures in such cases”.   
This lack of agency itself results in epistemic injustice and legal resistance and the 
law become one of few spaces that affords rights and protections. 
 
In her paper Karin draws upon Butler’s notion of cohabitance as an ethical 
responsibility to those who are suffering but who are not within our immediate kinship 
of family and friends. At the heart of this argument lie questions of what constitutes a 
community and community norms and what are our ethical obligations to such 
communities and individuals? Drawing upon ideas of proximity, time and space 
Butler argues that there are some kinds of ethical obligations, for example suffering 
created by war and displacement, which do not require as such our consent. For 
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Karin this argument for an ethical demand opens up the “possibilities to think a plural 
jurisprudence” (p 6).  
 
At the heart of debates on diversity and legal reasoning lie questions of power, 
representation and authority. Twining’s theory of a general jurisprudence aimed to 
theorize law in light of pluralism, legal pluralism and globalization. For Twining global 
jurisprudence was “part of the construction of a workable normative basis for co-
existence and co-operation in the context of a world characterized by pluralism of 
belief and dynamic multiculturalism” (2009: 5). Karin draws upon the work of legal 
scholars Douzinas and Gearey who develop the ideas further to consider the ways in 
which general jurisprudence “is concerned about a social ontology – a way of being 
together in the world” (p 5). Further, social theorists such as Santos point to ways in 
which ‘pluridiversity’ in all its forms must be recognized in law and legal relations if 
we are to fully capture multiple knowledges that challenge the dominant ways of 
seeing law as universal and monolithic from a western perspective and contact. For 
Karin a radical or deep diversity allows new thinking about the ways in which the 
‘human’ is conceptualized and interrogation of the dominant narratives on diversity in 
contemporary legal reasoning. She offers a situated account of the ways in which the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) raised the issues of 
knowledge and truth and the reflexive ways in which this “could be of value in 
thinking about diversity” (p 6). In this context the challenge of difference and diversity 
encompasses a move from existent knowledge to the acknowledgement of 
alternative knowledges and truth. This shift is both important and potentially a 
necessary dimension to facilitate an inclusive understanding of diverse practices in 
legal reasoning. Important questions remain however on the complexities and ways 
in which culture is framed, understood and articulated within marginalized and 
minority communities and its effects in relations of power in the TRC context. Further, 
the conflicts generated by demands for cultural group autonomy require further 
critical engagement of power relations within groups and its articulation and the move 
from knowledge to acknowledgment of diverse and multiple voices. The social 
norms, for example, promoting cultural and religious inequality and discriminatory 
practices that promote gender disadvantage within groups must also be challenged. 
In this way diversity in the form of justice, equality and autonomy as ruptures to 
existing liberal debates cannot be achieved without also challenging unequal social 
norms and harmful group practices.        
 
Critical race and feminist theorists have long drawn our attention to the ways in which 
state and legal relations operate within hegemonic discourses “in the very entrails of 
privilege and in mainstream practices and perspectives” (Medina 2013: 15). The 
ability therefore to develop new forms of discursive practices, legal cultures and 
spaces that allow for radically diverse legal reasoning is not only a significant 
challenge but one that must also include a robust challenge to dominant ideologies of 
diversity and identity in state law and community relations. In other words in order to 
understand the diversity and heterogeneity present in law and legal reasoning we 
must also recognize pre-existing social inequalities and the obstacles and 
disadvantages found under the current conditions of diversity and difference. 
Furthermore diverse groups inhabit diverse spaces and therefore we must remain 
vigilant to individual and group specificities that mean that diversity should operate 
also in relation to multiple perspectives and viewpoints. There is never one fixed 
position on what constitutes the diverse. Differently situated subjects raise the 
question of democracy and the emergence of new forms of democratic cultures as 
diverse knowledges. Karin’s question is therefore fundamental: how can we do things 
differently to ensure that those on the margins are centred?  _____________________________________________________________________________________________________  6  
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Knowledge and Feminist Interventions 
 
If ideas of what constitutes ‘knowledge proper’ are to be challenged it has been the 
work of critical feminist and black feminist interventions that point to the fact that the 
making and remaking of knowledge operates from the predominantly male 
institutions in which they have emerged and been validated. Feminist interventions 
have not only introduced us to concepts of subject, subjectivity, power and agency 
but an epistemological pedagogy that demands a critique of existing knowledge and 
our ways of seeing and the means of acquiring knowledge.    
 
Current state law policies on diversity can and do often operate to disavow multiple 
diverse voices, with diversity working to exclude and marginalize rather than as an 
inclusive dialogical process. Feminist legal theory critiques the paradigms, norms 
and practices inherent in law and legal practice with a specific focus on the 
marginalization of women and the operative effects of the ways in which notions of 
femininity and masculinity remain deeply embedded in legal practice and discourse. 
Debate has focused on a critique of legal doctrine and the ways in which legal 
language and legal concepts remain gendered.  
 
Black feminist activism has been at the forefront of demands for gender equality, the 
articulation of agency in oppressive contexts and critiques of liberal ideas and 
policies of the manifestation of diversity and diverse practices in law.  In response to 
the ways in which liberal projects on diversity and difference continue to be informed 
by little understanding of the marginalization and social exclusion experienced by the 
groups in question, black feminist scholarship raises important questions relating to 
the crucial interrelations between gender, class, race and personal and collective 
group identities. For example, on the issue of diversity and legal reasoning, critique 
must also include a critique of the political spaces that tolerate rupture and permit the 
emergence of cohabitation both as individual agency and as a collective group 
identity.  Situations of rupture also bring to the fore how we as individuals are to take 
responsibility for the ways in which we interpret, communicate and know (Medina 
2013: 313). This raises a set of questions: is it possible to respond to epistemic 
injustice and take responsibility for injustice that may have had nothing to do with us?  
What differentiates responsibility from cohabitation? What if we simply do not have 
the resources to correct injustices? Do we belong to normative structures of social 
life that prevent or inhibit the challenges of diversity? How do we take into account 
the complexities of context and social positionality that is necessary to be able to 
capture difference in all its complexity?  
 
Internal critique and contestation recognizing diverse social practices and lived 
experiences can become part of the ways in which epistemic injustice can be 
overcome. In other words differently constituted and situated subjects will have 
different resources to fight epistemic injustice. Our experiences are always open to 
reconstruction, assessment and re-evaluation through critical engagement with an 
indefinite number of experiential standpoints underpinned by social and political 
conditions. As Medina points out, “It is indeed very hard to live up to one’s epistemic 
responsibilities under conditions of oppression and systematic injustice, but not for 
everybody equally and to the same degree” (2013: 70) So, in short, those in 
disadvantaged positions can be also those who may be ill equipped to live up to their 
own ethical responsibilities with limited capacity for change, whereas those in 
privileged positions are in the position also to move from knowledge as fixed to an 
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acknowledgement of knowledge as diverse and multiple while challenging 
marginalization and oppression.  
 
Black feminist consciousness emerged in turn as part of a post-colonial critique of 
privileged white women subjects. According to Audre Lorde, one important aspect of 
this black feminist consciousness was the critique of categories on the basis of which 
racialized, sexist and classist assumptions were made about black women and men. 
Drawing upon the work of Fanon (1962), and his idea of whiteness and double 
consciousness, Lorde explored the black internalization of the white gaze and the 
experience of black women understood vis-à-vis the spectrum of visibility and 
invisibility.  In this way debates on diversity and plurality at a state level involve 
distorting realities and lived experiences in order to reinforce social and racial 
constructions of blackness as outsiders and others.  As Fanon (1962: 15) suggested, 
whiteness operates as a marker not of difference in the social imagination but of the 
mainstream. This leads to a critical awareness of the hierarchies of power upon 
which the binaries of women, class and race operate. As Lorde explains, “Much of 
western European history conditions us to see human differences in simplistic 
opposition to each other: dominance/subordination, good/bad, superior/inferior” 
(2007: 113).  For Lorde therefore, the question of how difference is socially and 
politically constructed in relation to age, race, class and sex was crucial from the 
outset if black feminists were to develop the tools to recognize, reclaim and define 
those differences which are imposed upon them. Black feminist scholarship and 
activism therefore played an important role in unmasking dominant ways of seeing 
racial and cultural difference, rendering visible the lived and social realities of black 
women’s lives in all their complexity, struggle and contestation. An important part of 
this was the critique also of internal power relations within the family, home and 
community. As Lorde reminds us, “For Black women, it is necessary at all times to 
separate the needs of the oppressor from our own legitimate conflicts within our 
communities” (2007: 118). Carefully avoiding the pitfalls of identity politics, Lorde 
critiqued the spaces inhabited by black women in western societies that were often 
marked by an erasure of knowledges not deemed worthy of ‘knowledge’. For her and 
many others overcoming marginalization can only happen with the challenging of 
both oppressive state law and internal family/ community practices.  This situated 
account disrupts the continued reproduction of social exclusion and injustice by 
producing epistemic interactions that can lead to resistance and change. She further 
explains, “It is not our differences which separate women, but our reluctance to 
recognize those differences and to deal effectively with the distortions which have 
resulted from the ignoring and misnaming of those differences” (2007: 122).  
 
For black feminists the analytical tool and conceptual framework of intersectionality 
therefore provides an understanding of the intersection of inequalities in relation to 
the analytic categories of race, class, gender, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, nation, 
religion and age, each intertwined and mutually constructing.  Intersectionality has 
subsequently been deployed in various social, political and legal settings to examine 
the intersection of inequalities (Crenshaw 1991). One important analysis relates to 
the interpersonal domain of power. Collins and Bilge (2016: 7) describe power 
relations as, “about people’s lives, how people relate to one another, and who is 
advantaged or disadvantaged within social interactions”.  
 
An intersectional and critical black feminist analysis therefore contributes to debates 
on diversity and legal reasoning in a number of ways, for example, to further our 
understanding of the ways in which diverse but intersectional knowledges produced 
out of structural inequalities also help to redefine notions of diversity. In this way this _____________________________________________________________________________________________________  8  
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scholarship operates as a form of “critical inquiry and critical praxis” (Collins and 
Bilge 2016: 31) that allows for the study of social phenomena such as legal cultures, 
not only as a critique of existing legal relations and the status quo but as an attempt 
to challenge and transform state law power relations. Intersectionality and black 
feminist approaches demand a self-reflexive look from its subjects, truths and 
practices. What are the ways in which an intersectional approach operates as a set 
of inquiries within state law relations and legal reasoning? A critical inquiry of 
intersectionality can be situated within wider debates on diversity and legal reasoning 
and linked to critiques of liberalism and neoliberalism as social theories of power. 
Locating debates on Butler’s cohabitation and feminist knowledges within an 
intersectional frame therefore allows for critiques of diversity and power relations 
within groups. Precisely because community resources and in-group inequalities may 
make it difficult to hear multiple voices this requires a closer understanding of 
individual capacity and the interrogation of dominant group narratives. 
 
Drawing upon the work of Jacqueline Rose and the themes of aesthetics and 
thinking, rootlessness, unpredictability, spontaneity and the ‘personal is the political’, 
and drawing upon the work of the socialist and political activist Rosa Luxemburg, 
Karin considers the ways in which these particular themes contribute to new ways to 
imagine the ways in which new knowledge can emerge in precarious marginalized 
contexts while producing new insights and ways of being. This analysis 
demonstrates the relations between subject, location and marginalization long 
explored in postcolonial literary theory and black feminist scholarship which draw 
upon such themes for a closer understanding of relations of power, self and historical 
conditions of repression, resistance and recuperation. For example Audre Lorde’s 
work draws upon and occupies positions of marginalization, the periphery and 
epistemic obstacles and struggles while destabilizing existing knowledge and 
challenging what is considered valid and as the truth. In her work she introduces the 
concept of the ‘unseen and unsaid’, where perception, feeling and experience 
become central to the spoken and written word and for her the importance of poetry 
was that it allowed an expression of knowledge previously deemed unworthy of what 
constituted knowledge and truth. Credibility of knowledge is therefore linked directly 
and indirectly to authority and power as truth and the lens through which the invisible 
is made visible. For Lorde and others drawing upon the notion of the ‘personal is 
political’, narrating and documenting the experience of lives lived on the periphery, 
precarious and fraught, away from any form of structure (informal or formal), provides 
the space upon which important insights of subject, truth, self and lived experience 
can be articulated. Lorde explained:  
 
When you asked how I began writing, I told you how poetry functioned 
specifically for me from the time I was very young. When someone said to 
me, “How do you feel?” Or “What do you think?” or asked another direct 
question, I would recite a poem and somewhere in that poem would be that 
feeling, that vital piece of information….The poem is my response. (2007: 87)  
 
It is therefore the spaces of rootlessness, otherness and unpredictability that provide 
the space for marginal voices and the emergence of new knowledge based on lived 
experience. As Lorde explains, “Those of us who stand outside the circle of this 
society’s definition of acceptable woman; those of us who have been forged in the 
crucibles of difference – those of us who are poor, who are lesbians, who are Black, 
who are older – know that survival is not an academic skill” (2007: 112). The 
epistemic injustice and its resistance therefore require extraordinary personal 
interactions to give voice to hidden, marginalized experience that remains mostly _____________________________________________________________________________________________________  9  
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hidden and silenced. Further in relation to aesthetics and thinking we can see also 
the ways in which lived experience and personal narratives of storytelling, poetry and 
art challenge the privilege of ‘representation’ of social experience. In this way 
epistemic resistance from the marginal and peripheral spaces can lead to new 





Karin’s paper raises challenges and demands a critical distance from current liberal 
projects on diversity and difference. In order for debates on diversity and legal 
reasoning not to become overly abstract or theoretical and therefore remain outside 
the social and cultural practices in which they operate, it is important that a critical 
rearticulation and reflection on the question of diversity and legal reasoning engages 
critically with questions of ontology, agency and the production and reproduction of 
resistant knowledges. As Karin’s paper makes clear this kind of critical engagement 
requires also a critique of internal power relations and knowledge claims made within 
communities and groups.  
 
Legal reasoning that includes a grammar of critique and recognizes power relations 
within groups and communities in relation to diversity debates can produce important 
insights. It can also identify and develop new definitions of power and new patterns 
of knowledge relating across difference. To this end it can produce a plural and 
diverse jurisprudence and legal reasoning. But Karin’s paper also draws upon 
feminist scholarship that redefines notions of the centre and the periphery in order for 
us to think of new ways of shared responsibilities and what it means to be part of a 
shared humanity in entirely new and different ways. We must, she demands, imagine 
new ways of being and thinking.  
 
The resources available to do so are themselves diverse. Epistemic injustice raises 
the question of what constitutes a resistant act. What about local resistant 
knowledges? Drawing upon Butler’s Excitable Speech we can see the ways in which 
performativity (as a resistant act) takes place as part of individual agency and in this 
way may challenge existing social structures or the habitus of the university. But as 
Medina points out, “Resistance is not always good, not in every sense of the word. 
There are resistances to know, obstacles to the process of knowledge acquisition” 
(2013: 57). In other words, challenging the resistance against radical diversity is also 
an important part of rethinking pluralism and diversity. This goes to the heart of 
questions of cohabitance and ethical responsibility of privileged subjects. 
 
Nevertheless ruptures made by marginalized groups occupying marginalized spaces 
can help to advance the emergence of cohabitation in diversity debates, while 
remaining vigilant that critiques do not overlook internal power relations and 
knowledge/ power effects on minorities within minority groups. Furthermore the work 
of black feminist scholarship and the category of intersectionality is useful in 
introducing complexity into debates around power, culture, difference and identity 
each of which are crucial to our understanding of social and legal relations. 
Intersectional scholars such as Nira Yuval Davis (2006) also draw upon the concepts 
of relationality and transversalism to interrogate the complexities of collective identity 
politics in overcoming epistemic injustice. In other words an intersectional and black 
feminist approach demands that debates on diversity must also engage with social 
inequalities and the particular social contexts in which epistemic knowledges and 
practices are produced.  New perspectives and voices emerge only when social _____________________________________________________________________________________________________  10  
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identities and positionalities are gives spaces to articulate more knowledges. If legal 
reasoning as Karin argues is to become truly diverse it must not only address its own 
limitations but must also draw upon alternative social imaginaries and a critical 
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